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I Introduction
When the words "black" and "music" appear in the same sentence, the most obvious guess is that someone is using a politically incorrect term for "Afro-American music" (say, jazz or blues).
However, a much more likely subject in Italy would be the situation of the musicians' labour market. Estimates of the Italian musicians' union (Sindacato Italiano Artisti della Musica) 1 put the percentage of Italian musicians who work entirely or partially on the shadow market at an average of 95% for the last few years; the remaining 5% are either employed as classical musicians (about 1.5%) or have enough bargaining power (because of their success) to earn a living as self-employed pop artists (about 3.5%). While there are, to the best of my knowledge, no hard data on the subject, it seems reasonable to believe that, as is often the case in Italian labour markets, people tend to be stuck on whatever side they happen to land at the beginning of their career: if they manage to get a regular job early on, they are likely to keep it for the rest of their lives, otherwise they tend to stay in the black market for as long as they are willing to work as musicians. This is at least what casual observation suggests, and also what the union claims. Now, it is true that the shadow economy is an important feature of the Italian society:
Schneider and Este (2002) estimate its size at about one quarter of GDP in the '90, to be compared with an average of 12% for developed countries as a whole. Still, a labour market for a perfectly legal job that is almost entirely irregular is something worth our attention. In this note, we strive to understand the forces that have led to such a peculiar situation. In order to do so, we build a theoretical model in which we embed the main institutional features of the Italian system -in particular, social security. We identify, within a second-best setting, a natural tendency for the musicians'labour market to split into a regular part and an irregular one, and point out that in Italy prominent institutional features exacerbate, rather than compensate, this tendency. This way, we are able to explain the overwhelming prevalence of the black labour market in the case of musicians, and also to point out the policy reforms needed to reverse this state of a¤airs. We discuss how the reforms might a¤ect social welfare and whether they are politically feasible. We notice that the most promising policy instrument is a unemployment bene…t for full-time musicians; under certain circumstances, raising such a bene…t may turn out to be Pareto-improving because it induces more talented individuals to choose a career 1 See the union's website, www.sindacatomusicisti.it, accessed January 2009; the site is in Italian.
as regular, full-time musicians, and the revenue raised from taxing the income of these new musicians might then more than o¤set the increased revenue requirement. Although the model is geared to interpret the Italian situation, we identify some insights that have general validity for any musicians'labour market. Our analysis applies to other workers in the entertainment industry, e.g. actors.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we provide the institutional and theoretical background. Section 3 illustrates our modelling strategy. Section 4 includes the analysis and the main results. Section 5 rounds o¤ the paper with a …nal discussion.
II Background
In our model, individuals are partitioned into two groups, those who do not have talent for becoming musicians, work in an ordinary labour market and purchase music, and those who happen to have such a talent (which we take to be exogenously given -more on this later).
The talented agents may decide to become full-time self-employed musicians or to enter the ordinary labour market, work full-time there, and also part-time as musicians. 2 Notice that, while in principle anybody can handle two jobs, it is de…nitely easier for musicians and other workers in the entertainment industry, because the working hours of an ordinary job and a musician's job are compatible: people want to be entertained in their free time, that is at night, during the week-end or the summer holidays. Hence, although the arguments that we develop in what follows could be applied to other situations, they make sense especially for the case of entertainment workers. 3 In principle, both jobs could be regular, but there are obvious incentives to keep one on the shadow market; the …rst job is enough to gain access to several welfare services, and given the progressivity of the tax system, the extra-income from the second job would be relatively modest. Since the income ‡ow of a musician is bound to be highly erratic relative to that of an ordinary worker, due to such things as the vagaries of musical tastes or the competition from DJ's and others who use pre-recorded music, it generally makes sense to keep the employment 2 We are not interested here in the superstar phenomenon (originally studied by Rosen 1981 and Adler 1985 and then generalised to non-artistic labour markets by Frank and Cook 1995); we consider all musicians to be "normal" ones. Casual observation as well as the data we cited above suggest that this is a safe modelling strategy, as only a tiny percentage of musicians become superstars. 3 Most of what we say about musicians would be true for other artists, e.g. actors.
3 as musician in the shadow market. We will later illustrate the conditions under which agents actually prefer to go black, and argue that they are often satis…ed in the Italian context. Of course, there are limitations to what a moonlighting musician can do -for example, touring is going to be more di¢ cult, due to the demands of the "day job". We will take this into account in the model by the simple expedient of assuming that there are less days available for working as a musician when one is in the shadow market. Another simpli…cation is that we rule out the possibility of black markets for ordinary jobs.
The institutional features
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As we will argue later, the tendency of musicians to work on the shadow market is, at least potentially, present in any second best economy. In Italy, it is compounded by the peculiar features of the welfare system for the workers in the entertainment industry, especially the fact that pension contributions for any particular year are lost if a musician does not work at least 120 days in that year. Abstracting for a moment from the possibility of …scal inspections, if a musician is uncertain as to the number of days she will have the opportunity to work, then she will only pay the contributions if she estimates a su¢ ciently large likelihood that this number is higher than 120; otherwise, she would rather go "black". For example, if a musician works only at week-ends, there are at most 104 days available; obviously, the individual might decide not to moonlight only if tax inspectors constitute a real danger (which is generally not the case in Italy). It is true that a musician is entitled to a (modest) unemployment bene…t if she works less then 78 days in one year, but the gap between 78 and 120 is rather large and the incentives to moonlight remain basically the same: working for 104 days, one loses both the bene…t and the pension contributions. Also, unlike all other workers in Italy, employees or self-employed, musicians do not have access to a publicly subsidised insurance system, despite the fact that the stage is an obviously dangerous working place. This hardly quali…es as a workers'welfare system; perhaps those who designed it shared the view of the anonymous character in the Dire Straits song "Money for nothing", who wistfully notices of musicians that "...them guys ain't dumb...that ain't working, that's the way you do it, get your money for nothing..."
It is worth remarking that the rules concerning public pensions in Italy impose that the bene…t paid to the retired worker is directly related to the total amount of contributions. The system is of the "pay-as-you-go" variety, but, starting from 1995, the bene…ts are computed according to a formula that mimics the fully-funded systems; the total amount of contributions, plus the interests paid by the State, 5 determine the total amount of bene…ts, and the yearly bene…t is given by this total amount divided by the number of years a person is expected to live as a pensioner. This makes the fact that pension contributions for musicians are only valid conditional on a minimum number of worked days extremely peculiar. A year in which a musician works little would add little to the total pension bene…ts to which he or she is entitled, but still it is unclear why he or she should be made to lose the contributions. Possibly, the idea is to force a person into a career -either you are a full-time musician, and then you are entitled to the social security services, or you should de…nitely leave the music world, and go for an ordinary job. As it happens, the outcome is that most talented individuals do go for an ordinary job, but moonlight as musicians.
Finally, we notice that, whatever the origin of these peculiar arrangements, there are now strong interests against any change of the status quo. There are obvious positive …nancial consequences for the institution managing the pension system when a substantial share of the workers pay contributions but do not get bene…ts. As a matter of fact, in Italy musicians and other workers in the entertainment industry have their social security system managed by a separate agency (ENPALS, see fn. 4), that in these latest years has been using (or trying to use) the extra-revenue from the "lost" contributions to help cover the expenses for the current pensions, computed before the 1995 reform with a very generous formula that did not take the amount of paid contributions into account. It is clearly in the interest of the management of ENPALS to keep the current state of a¤airs unchanged, as long as they are able to enforce the payment of contributions also from musicians who work less then 120 days per year (and possibly more than 78). The musicians' union's main charge against ENPALS is in fact that the latter redistributes resources away from the currently working musicians towards current pensioners -with the aggravating circumstance that the latter come mostly from the elite of employed classical musicians or successful pop artists. At a more general level, we can also point out that the current pension system for musicians is, unlike the one prevailing for all 5 The interests paid each year cover the in ‡ation rate plus a spread proportional to the rate of growth of national income. For a detailed presentation of the Italian pension system after 1995, see Sartor (2001) . 5 other workers, actuarially unfair, that is it implies an expected bene…t which is less than the contributions paid.
Models of artists'labour market
Apart from the superstar models referred to in fn. 2, which we do not consider for the reasons given there, another dominant paradigm in the modelisation of artists' labour markets is the work-preference approach pioneered by Throsby (1994) -see also Cowen and Tabarrok (2000) and Caserta and Cuccia (2001) for subsequent developments. As is well-known, these models postulate that artists have special utility functions. Unlike other workers, who derive utility only from their net income/consumption, artists gain utility also by working in their artistic occupation. Since their earnings from this occupation are however generally low and somewhat erratic, artists allocate their time partly to utility-generating but poorly paid artistic work, and partly to disutility-generating but better paid non-artistic work. Given the assumed preference structure, this behaviour is of course perfectly rational and indeed risk-minimising.
In the present paper, as mentioned, we assume that artist have a special talent for music. It is understood, although not explicitly modelled, that the special talent is acquired through some form of education and training. To keep the model simple, we treat the talent as exogenous, but the reader should keep in mind that, behind the scenes, there has been a stage of human capital accumulation. Unlike the work-preference model, no intrinsic reward is associated to composing or performing music. However, the two modelling strategies are basically equivalent in their predictions, most notably both plausibly describe artists as having more than one occupation.
We have chosen the present version because it is more amenable to the tax/bene…t analysis that is crucial to our reasoning.
III A model of the musicians'labour market in Italy
We employ an extremely simple overlapping generations model. Consider a population whose total size (constant over periods) is normalised to unity; a share of the individuals are untalented, whereas the remaining 1 are endowed with a talent for music. In the -group, individuals are di¤erentiated by an ability parameter, which we normalise as being equal to the …xed per-period income he or she earns on the ordinary labour market; income is continuously distributed on the support (w ; w + ) and f (w) is the corresponding distribution function. Also the agents in the (1 a)-group are di¤erentiated by the same ability parameter, now equal to the …xed income they could earn on the ordinary market, should they decide not to work as full-time musicians; the support is the same, and the distribution function is g (w). The share of agents who combine the ordinary and the musician's job is denoted ; the share of full-time musicians is instead -of course, + = 1 . Agents live for 2 periods, working in the …rst, and spending the second as pensioners; we use in fact a slightly modi…ed version of the usual life-cycle model, often employed for studying intertemporal policy issues. In each period, there are two generations alive, one of workers and the other of pensioners. The economy replicates itself unvaryingly period after period; hence, we will not use a generation index in our notation below.
Ordinary workers
Non-musicians consume a composite good c in periods 1 and 2; for simplicity, we take it that they only consume m in period 2. 6 The composite good is produced in a perfectly competitive industry, with linear technology and labour as the only (variable) input; the production price is normalised to unity. Music is only produced and consumed as live shows and it is measured in days (one day=one show). The price of a music show is endogenous; at this stage, however, we consider the behaviour of the agents once it has been agreed upon, and later we will illustrate how it is determined (the usual backward solution strategy). Notice that m takes discrete values, and we take it to be outside the choice of the consumer: to rationalise this, we assume that agents cannot control neither the number of shows that are interesting for them (that depends of course on the schedules of the artists) nor the number of the ones they can actually attend among those (unforeseeable circumstances like bad weather or illnesses may force them not to go). As a further simpli…cation, we take m to be the same for all agents. This latter point is in fact inessential and is only meant to save on notation; the crucial assumption is the exogeneity of m, not that fact that it is equal for all. The role of the exogeneity assumption is to simplify the derivation of the musicians'income from their activity; by keeping the number of attended shows …xed, we can more easily model the endogenous determination of the price at which the tickets for the shows are sold (and thus of the earnings of the musicians).
The agent's gross income is simply w. Disposable income, though, depends on the impact of policy; we consider two forms of public intervention: redistributive taxation and pensions.
At this stage of the analysis, the reason why these policy instruments have come into being is immaterial -they might have been imposed by a benevolent dictator, or generated by a political process. All that matters is that they are in place, and constrain the agents' behaviour. We choose the simplest possible form of second-best redistributive taxation, the linear income tax, made of a constant marginal income tax rate t > 0 and a uniform lump-sum subsidy T > 0.
The gross tax liability increases at a constant pace with income, while the subsidy is the same for everybody, so that high-income agents pay into the system more than they get out of it;
this makes the linear income tax a simple but e¤ective approximation of real-world progressive tax systems. The lump-sum subsidy, in particular plays the role of what in the real-world are tax allowances. Notice that since income is …xed, the marginal tax rate does not distort the time allocation; however, as we shall see, it may distort the occupational choice for musicians. 7
Also, agents have to pay for their pensions, and we take to be the proportional rate of pension contribution. The …rst period budget constraint is thus
where the superscript denotes the period, the subscript denotes the agent type (ow for ordinary worker) and s are savings. Once retired, the agent's disposable income equals his pension bene…t plus the returns from his savings. Since national income is constant over time, and there is no in ‡ation, 8 the pension bene…t, computed according to the Italian method described above, is w; that is, it equals the contribution paid. The pension system simply shifts consumption from one period to the next. 9 The second period budget constraint, with r denoting the interest rate,
solving the second-period budget constraint for s, and substituting into the …rst-period constraint, we obtain
for the "e¤ective" tax rate faced by the individuals, we can simplify the notation:
It is worth noting a feature of the model that plays a somewhat hidden role in shaping the budget constraint. In order to be realistic, one has to assume that the pension system is of the pay-as-you-go variety, that is current contributions are immediately employed to cover the expenditure for current pensions. That being the case, it would not in general be true that any single agent could get as a pension exactly what he had to remit in contributions and that at the same time the budget of the social security agency could break even. In our case, it is however true, because the economy replicates itself period after period without changing.
We postulate an extremely simple utility function for the ordinary workers, in which the consumption of live music shows enters linearly, and the consumption levels of the composite good in the two periods are regarded as perfect complements:
where is the utility (measured in consumption units) from an additional music show. This modelling strategy is dictated by the opportunity to keep the model as uncluttered as possible in all the aspects that are not central to the analysis. Using this utility function, we can derive immediately the optimal consumption path of the agents, and, using the fact that the marginal utility of a music show is …xed, we can approach the bargaining stage for the determination of the musicians'income in a straightforward way, as we shall see presently. No other property of the model or result of the analysis is in any way dependent on the simpli…ed utility function that we use; in particular, the partition of the labour market between full-time and part-time musicians that we derive later on stems exclusively from the assumption that only some agents have a talent for music, and not at all from the form of the utility function.
We know that maximising (6) subject to (5) requires that c 1 ow = c 2 ow ; letting c ow denote the common consumption level, is then easy to …nd that
Substituting c ow back into the utility function, we obtain an expression for the indirect utility, which we express as a function of the policy variables, U (t; T; ). Using the envelope theorem 9 we note for future use the following properties:
To further emphasise the limited impact that our choice for the utility function has on the development of the model, we remark here that the signs of the above derivatives are valid for all utility functions -only the speci…c functional forms follow from our speci…c utility function.
Of course, the results that we derive in Section 4 below only depend on the signs.
Full-time musicians
Musicians, on the other hand, only enjoy the composite good, so their utility function can be represented as
where i = f m; pm denotes a full-time or a part-time musician. Starting with the former, we take it that the number of days a full-time musician works in the …rst period is a discrete random variable that can take three values, d a , d a and d c , with probability p a , p b and p c ; respectively;
For each worked day, the musician earns x = n ( ) units of consumption good, where n is the share of the untalented population that happens to attend the show and is the cost of the show borne by the musician. So, total expected gross income in the …rst period is x:
Expected net income depends on how policy interacts with the agent's actions. A musician pays the income tax and the pension contributions, and receives the subsidy, the same as the ordinary worker; moreover, if he works d c days he is entitled to an unemployment bene…t paid by the State. That is, we assume that the state provides a form of social insurance to compensate the fact that the income of musicians is uncertain, unlike that of ordinary workers (this captures an essential feature of the current situation in Italy, as described above). Thus, the budget constraint in period 1 is
As for the pension bene…t, we assume that only if the agent works d a days, its contributions are valid towards the computation of the bene…t (this again re ‡ects the current institutional setting in Italy). Thus, the pension bene…t is given by p a d a x, and the budget constraint is
The problem of a full-time musician is then to maximise (9) s.t.
The solution is identi…ed by
Deriving the indirect utility function as before, and denoting it as u (t; T; ; ) we obtain the following model properties:
The same caveat as before applies: the signs are independent of the speci…c utility function, although the functional forms of course are not.
Part-time musicians
We assume that moonlighting is always a superior option to keep music as a regular second job (later in this subsection we give the precise condition under which this occurs); given the data we gave on the employment of musicians in Italy, this is clearly an empirically plausible assumption. Thus, part-time musicians'gross incomes are given by w plus what they earn on the black market. We assume that moonlighting involves a cost, in that the agent must hide his activity from the …sc. In the relevant literature, tax dodging is modelled either as avoidance (a costly but riskless activity) or evasion (risky because of tax inspections and consequent …nes)
-see e.g. Cowell (1990b) . We use the avoidance approach, following Slemrod (2001) among others, because it is analytically simpler; in our case, however, we do not interpret avoidance literally as depicting a situation in which there are no chances to be discovered once the cost is incurred, but as a reduced form of the evasion approach. To do so, we think of the cost of avoidance as the "monetary amount that the person would just be prepared to pay in order to be guaranteed that he will get away with evasion" (Cowell, 1990a , p. 232 -see also Balestrino and Galmarini, 2003) , thereby converting a problem of choice under uncertainty into an equivalent one under certainty. Finally, notice that the cost of avoidance depends, in principle, also on policy: the government decides how much e¤ort to put into the enforcement of the tax code.
We will not particularly pursue this line of enquiry in the paper, letting enforcement be …xed at some exogenous level for most of the analysis; however, we refer occasionally to what might happen if enforcement could be controlled.
Thus, we let d be the number of days a part-time musician can work on the black market, and k (d) be an increasing and strictly convex function describing the cost of moonlighting.
Then, gross income in the working period is
Taking into account the policy instruments, the budget constraint is
Since pension bene…ts are computed as for ordinary workers, the constraint in the second period
Then, the combined budget constraint is
It turns out to be convenient to interpret the part-time musicians' maximisation problem as a two-step process; …rst, they choose the optimal number of moonlighting days, that is they maximise their total income; given this, they choose their intertemporal consumption allocation.
The …rst step is characterised by the …rst order condition
we let d = d (x) be the optimal number of moonlighting days; given that the cost function k (d) is independent of w, d does not vary across agents. Maximised lifetime income is thus
At this stage, we can rationalise the assumption that part-time musicians always moonlight rather than having two regular jobs. Suppose that the largest number of worked days as a musician compatible with the working schedule of the ordinary job is d; then, the net lifetime income from the second job is (1 ) dx. We are assuming that
In the second step, part-time musicians maximise (9) s.t.
The solution is
Finally, we again derive the indirect utility in the usual way, and compute
Once again, we remark that the signs of these derivatives are independent of the functional form of the utility function.
Bargaining over the price of a music show
We have now all the elements for investigating the determination of the price of a music show.
Our intent in making such price endogenous was to capture, simply but e¤ectively, the way in which a musician's income is formed in the real world, where it would depend on how well he manages to sell his or her shows. Of course, in the real world there are additional actors besides the consumers and the producers of music, such as the musician's agent and the owner of the venue where the show is performed. In our simpli…ed setup, we suppose that bargaining takes places directly between the consumers and the musicians, dispensing with these intermediariesit would actually be easy to account for their role, but the model would only gain an additional layer of complexity without generating any further insight. We have also built the model so as to make this bargaining stage as simple as possible, in such a way that it generates the same price for all possible consumer-musician interactions (that is, the price does not depend on the consumer's income).
Let us take then a typical situation in which an ordinary agent and a musician bargain over the price of the show. If an agreement is found, the ordinary agent gains , whereas the musician gains ; both have a fall-back positions of zero gains and zero losses if the bargain is not struck (i.e. bargaining takes place before costs are incurred). Therefore, a simple Nash solution is found by choosing so as to maximise 
that is the price is a weighted average of the cost and of the marginal utility of a show, with the weights given by the bargaining power parameters. For the model to work, we have to assume that > ; so that necessarily falls between and ; this way, both buyer and seller have something to gain from reaching an agreement.
Importantly, the price is directly proportional to the marginal utility , which we can interpret as the consumer's willingness to pay for the show (it is in fact expressed in units of the numeraire). We will argue that is relatively small, since musical tastes, in Italy like elsewhere, are today biased towards the English-speaking world. 10 Our contention is that the deep di¤er-ences existing between the two musical traditions imply that as consumers learn to appreciate English/American music, their willingness to pay for listening to Italian music is reduced. Indeed, Italian music is based on a tradition going back at least to the second half of the XVI century, according to which songs are built along a melodic line with chord-based accompaniment (a melody is a sequence of notes; a chord is obtained instead when three or more notes sound simultaneously). In these compositions, rhythm is relatively unimportant and largely unvarying throughout the piece, whereas much importance is attached to the singer's technical abilities. Over the centuries, the songwriting, playing and singing styles have become uniquely
Italian inasmuch as the melodies have to adapt themselves to a country's language. In the XIX century Romantic musicians like Verdi also became nationalistic icons (for more on these issues, see e.g. Gri¢ ths, 2006). Against this deeply rooted and value-laden tradition, in ‡uences from the English-speaking world have brought to Italy jazz, blues, rock'n'roll, progressive rock, electro-pop, disco music, rap, hip-hop and a variety of other genres and sub-genres, some more sophisticated, other de…nitely popular. For most of these genres, rhythm is key in terms of what "makes the song", and even when melody matters, it will be a melody suitable for the Anglo-Saxon language or perhaps left to an instrument as opposed to the vocal part. It is easy to imagine that as the consumers get used to such a foreign musical style, they will not express a particularly large willingness to pay for Italian music: will be relatively low, and so will be , and consequently the income that the musicians can earn from their shows. 11
IV The labour market equilibrium and the role of policy
The labour market for ordinary workers presents no particular features. It is instead necessary to determine the partition of musicians into full-and part-timers. From the way we set up the optimisation problem of the two categories of agents, it is clear that a musician will work part-time as long as the disposable income he enjoys exceeds the income he would have working full-time (and viceversa). This follows because the two types of musicians have the same utility function, and therefore their maximised utility will be higher the larger is their total income.
The partition of musicians in …rst and second best
In order to appreciate the peculiarity of the Italian institutional setting, we adopt a three-step procedure. First, we establish a double benchmark by showing how the partition criterion would work: i) in a laissez-faire situation, without policy, and ii) in a generic second-best setting in which the pension system is actuarially fair also for musicians. Only then we consider the Italian case.
In laissez-faire, the part-time work as musicians would not be intended as moonlighting, but simply as a second job, and therefore the number of worked days would be the largest compatible with the working schedule of the ordinary job, which we denoted above as d. A part-time musicians would earn w + dx over his lifetime, and a full-time musician would earn x; income would be shifted from one period to another through savings. The threshold ability level would then be implicitly identi…ed by
that is
1 1 One might argue that Italian musicians could learn to play and sing the way American or English musicians do. In fact, this is what superstars often do: we have Neapolitan bluesmen, Tuscanian rappers, and so on. But for the average musician the di¢ culties of learning a totally di¤erent style of playing are often insurmountable (the unusual rhythms of Anglo-Saxon music are for example a big hurdle).
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All talented agents with ability strictly greater than w LF would become part-time musicians, and the remaining ones would become full-time musicians. 12 Plausibly, > d, that is the number of days a part-time musician can actually work is less than the number of days he expects to work as a full-timer; then, w LF > 0. This identi…es the population shares LF and LF in laissez-faire:
Clearly, the fraction of full-time musicians (i.e. ) increases with w LF ; in this speci…c case, this implies that the larger is the di¤erence between and d, the more musicians will choose to become full-timers. This re ‡ects the fact that full-time musicians are those whose earning ability on the ordinary market is lowest; if the possibility to supplement this ordinary income with a second job is limited, then there is a strong incentive to become full-timers.
Let us consider now the partition of musicians in a generic second-best setting. Supposing then that such a pension system works like the one operating in the ordinary labour market, and more precisely that it is actuarially fair, the lifetime income of a full-time musician would simply be
We should …nd the value of w for which this income equals that earned as part-time musician, that is the value of w that solves
i.e.
Of course, w SB determines SB and SB just as w LF determines LF and LF -see above.
We emphasised that the threshold income depends on the policy instruments; for future use, we compute the following derivatives:
1 2 Those with ability e w are indi¤erent between the two career options, and we assume that they choose to become full-time musicians.
Hence, marginally increasing the unemployment bene…t has an unambiguously positive e¤ect:
indeed, a larger unemployment bene…t makes the career as full-time musician more appealing, and therefore a larger number of talented agents will choose it. The e¤ects of the income tax rate t and of the pension contribution rate are in principle ambiguous: when either t or changes, it makes both career choices less interesting in absolute terms, but it also changes their relative appeal. For this general second-best setting, it is possible to say which of the two e¤ects prevails: a rise in the tax or in the contribution rate rises the cut-o¤ income level, and therefore makes a career as full-time musicians more appealing.
A question of some interest is to what extent policy distorts the e¢ cient partition of the workers in the two musical careers relative to the e¢ cient laissez-faire solution. This is relevant on at least two accounts. First, there is the general problem of the e¢ cient allocation of resources: if there are too few or too many full-time musicians, then human capital is not being used e¢ ciently, as there are agents who could do better by switching to another job. Second, there is the speci…c problem of tax avoidance: since in the second-best economy part-time musicians hide a share of their income from the …sc, the partition of musicians matters in terms of revenue -the more full-time musicians there are, the less revenue is lost.
To answer our question, we can simply compare w LF with w SB -the number of full-time musicians is increasing in the threshold income. A few computations yield
Notice that the l.h.s. of the second inequality in (34) is nothing but the "moonlighting condition"
(19) that we assumed to be valid in the Italian case. Supposing that the condition holds also for this generic second-best economy, then the term is positive. Hence, the presence of a black market works in the direction of making w LF larger than w SB -in other terms, it favours an ine¢ ciently small number of full-time musicians. There are two ways in which this tendency can be contrasted. First, we might have a relatively large unemployment bene…t. Second, it might be that moonlighting is too costly, e.g. because there are e¤ective enforcement procedures that rise k (d) up to the point where the moonlighting condition is no longer satis…ed. We can thus state:
Claim 1 In a second-best economy there are ine¢ ciently few full-time musicians if the black market is accessible (i.e. the moonlighting condition holds) and the unemployment bene…t is small or indeed absent.
The partition of musicians in the Italian labour market
Let us now move to the model that has been devised so as to capture the main institutional features of the Italian situation. The identi…cation of the threshold ability level requires again that we consider the point at which the income from being a full-timer equals the income from being a part-timer:
This yields
As we know, this means that only agents with ability less than w IT become full-time musicians;
IT and IT are determined as above. Notice that the determination of the value of this threshold (like those of the other thresholds) is also a¤ected by the level of x, the income ‡ow accruing to the musician from each show. So far, we have not commented on its role, since in the context of hypothetical …rst-best or second-best economies, we did not have any way to guess its relative importance. However, in the case of Italy we have argued above that, due to the competition from abroad, the price each consumer pays to attend the show is not likely to be very large; hence, we expect x not to be large either. This clearly tends to discourage musicians from becoming full-time professionals, and identi…es a …rst factor in reducing the absolute number of them in Italy.
A question that naturally comes to mind is whether the distortions encountered in the general second-best case are reinforced in the Italian setting by the presence of the actuarially unfair pension system. Predictably, the answer is positive. To see this, consider …rst that the conditions of Claim (1) are naturally met in the Italian case; the moonlighting condition is satis…ed, and the unemployment bene…t is small; thus, we expect that even without the distortion induced by the pension system the group of full-time musicians would be ine¢ ciently small. This latter distortion further complicates things: a comparison between the threshold income for the case of Italy and that for the general second-best setting using (36) and (30), yields, after a few manipulations,
The di¤erence is given, as expected, by the lost bene…t -the share of contributions that is not converted into a pension bene…t. Then, recalling that a higher threshold income implies more full-time musicians, we may conclude that:
Claim 2 In the Italian institutional setting, the presence of an actuarially unfair pension system reduces the number of full-time musicians below the level that would prevail if the economy were generically second-best.
In other words, if the workers in the entertainment industry received the same social security treatment as anybody else, the gap between the actual and the e¢ cient size of the group of full-time musicians would be reduced. This conclusion allows us to evaluate critically one of the main demands of the Italian musicians'union -namely that the speci…city of the pension system for the workers in the entertainment industry is removed, and that they are treated like ordinary workers (thereby receiving as pensioners the actuarially fair value of their contributions). The arguments put forward by the union are rooted mostly in the horizontal equity principle, stating that agents sharing equal traits should be treated equally -in this case, all workers should receive the same social security treatment. Our analysis provides a somewhat more basic argument:
reforming the pension system is needed for e¢ ciency reasons, that is for favouring the proper functioning of the labour market. In practice, it is however di¢ cult to say whether the musicians' union might …nd the political strength to impose this reform against the short-term interest of the ENPALS management.
Even supposing that the pension system could be changed in the above direction, and the economy could thus be turned into a generic second-best one, e¢ ciency in the musicians'labour market would not be restored (see Claim 1). There is a tendency, inherent to the presence of second-best taxation, to discourage musically talented agents from becoming full-time musicians;
this is represented by the l.h.s. of the second inequality in (34). However, there is at least a countervailing policy instrument, the unemployment bene…t -appearing on the r.h.s. of the above-mentioned inequality; inasmuch as it provides a form of insurance against the ‡uctuations of the full-time musicians'incomes, it might in principle o¤set the negative impact brought about by the income tax. We devote the remainder of this section to an investigation of the role of the unemployment bene…t as an e¢ ciency-enhancing instrument.
Restoring e¢ ciency in the second-best economy
As mentioned above, restoring e¢ ciency matters not only in the general sense that it is desirable to use the available resources e¢ ciently, but also as a way of …ghting tax avoidance: by reducing the number of moonlighters, we can increase revenue and the general well-being of the population. Now, the discussion leading to Claim 1 seems to suggest a straightforward solution to the question of how to restore e¢ ciency in a generic second-best economy. By setting
the government would be able to bring the number of agents who work as full-time musicians to its e¢ cient level, as in this case the threshold income w SB equals the e¢ cient laissez-faire threshold w LF -see (34). It remains to be seen, however, how the government can fund the expenditure implied by the unemployment bene…t. As public debt is not contemplated in our model, this might be done by raising the tax rate t, or reducing the universal subsidy T ; both options could however be opposed by the ordinary workers (and by the part-time musicians).
Apparently, those who work on the ordinary labour market have all to lose and nothing to gain from this sort of reform. This however turns out not to be entirely correct. To give a de…nitive answer on who gains and who loses, and hence who might oppose and who might favour the reform, we need a more comprehensive analysis that includes the role of the public budget.
To begin with, let us write the overall public budget constraint for each period; the budget of the social security agency does not appear explicitly, as it is always balanced by construction.
Assuming no extra-revenue requirement, we have
where it is important to keep in mind that w SB is itself a function of the policy variables -see above. This simply says that the revenue from taxing ordinary workers and part-time musicians (…rst term) plus the revenue from taxing full-time musicians (second term) must equal the total expenditure given by the poll-subsidy and the unemployment bene…t (third term). 13 We will examine two alternative balanced-budget reforms; we raise the unemployment bene…t to reduce ine¢ ciency in the labour market, and adjust another policy instrument in such a way that the budget equation remains satis…ed. In one case, we adjust the universal subsidy T , and in the other case, we adjust the tax rate t.
However, it is at least possible to reduce the ine¢ ciency as long as the larger number of fulltime musicians ensures an increase in revenue. It should also be noticed that, even supposing that one could restore the e¢ cient partition of the labour market, moonlighting would not be eliminated, as the incentives to avoid taxes remain. Thus, the unemployment bene…t may act as a substitute for tax enforcement, but only partially. It might however reduce the number of moonlighting musicians to a signi…cant extent, thereby making the usual strategies (more inspections, heavier …nes, etc.) less costly and more e¤ective.
V Discussion: sketches of Italy
What can we conclude from the above analysis? Are there lessons to be learned for the musicians' labour market in general, rather than for the speci…c Italian case? These are the main questions we want to address in these concluding remarks.
As far as Italy is concerned, we identi…ed four plausible culprits for the sad state of a¤airs in the musician's labour market:
the high accessibility of the black market: as we saw in the Introduction, a large share of the Italian economy is irregular, and the enforcement procedures are de…nitely on the lax side, hence we expect the "moonlighting condition" (19) to be satis…ed and indeed to exhibit a large positive value; the relatively low willingness to pay for Italian music: since musical tastes tend to be biased towards products from the English-speaking world, Italian musicians cannot expect to earn large sums by selling their own shows to Italian consumers, and this makes a career as full-time musician less attractive; the low level of the unemployment bene…t: in line with the generally "thin" nature of the social security system, little insurance is provided against the large ‡uctuations of the musicians'income, despite the fact that market-provided alternatives are not available (as it is usually the case for this sort of risk); the presence of an actuarially unfair pension system, that forces the vast majority of musicians to pay contributions in excess of the actual value of the bene…ts to be received in the future and as such is in fact strongly criticised by the musicians'union.
All four factors contribute, to varying extents, to make a career as professional, full-time musician not particularly appealing and might explain the overwhelmingly irregular nature of the labour market.
In other Western economies, these factors are not necessarily present, or not all of them are. Tax enforcement might be su¢ ciently strict to keep the size of the black economy under control, musical tastes might not be strongly biased towards foreign products, there might be general programs supporting unemployed individuals, and pensions systems might be not so grossly unfair as in the Italian case. However, at least the …rst factor is likely to be of some relevance everywhere: second-best taxes do provide an incentive for musicians to moonlight, thanks to the peculiar working hours of their job. It is therefore to be expected that some of the talented agents decide not to take up music as a full-time profession, that is there might be less professional musicians as there should be in an e¢ cient partition of the labour market. If that is the case, we identi…ed a simple policy reform that can remedy this ine¢ ciency: raising the unemployment bene…t will encourage more individuals to become musicians full-time. This will in turn make more agents prone to reveal their true tax bases, and the consequent increase in revenue might be large enough to o¤set the costs of stepping up the unemployment program -might indeed generate a Pareto-improving redistribution via the tax system.
